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7'hr uulhor z \  (1 rnr,rli r of thr 111\10,-4 ciefiarlm~nl al T~xa.5 
.iLG,M I >~~vn~zt?-(,o~nmtrrco. 
In  1965 and 1966 the Republic of Korea (ROI;) sent 
htro infantry divisions and a k w  other support units to serve in 
the Republic of Vietnam (RI'N). This decision reflected the 
strength of 1I.S.-Korean relations. The ROK ~t.holt.heartedlv sup- 
ported the C.S. initiative in \'ietrlarrl in an effort to keep Atner- 
ican tr-oops on the Korean peninsula. E\.rrl so, tklc South 
Koreans refused to let C.S. officials take them for granted. man- 
ifesting their- independence in two \t7at's: First, the Koreans in- 
sisted on high-level consultation and requests iron1 either the 
C.S. President or I'icc-President, although the\ ~voultl negotiate 
~tith indi\riduals as lo\\ as the secre~ries  of  Statr or Defense. Sec- 
ond, this L.S. ally demanded and I-eceiveci substantial conlpen- 
>ation tc)r the assignrnrnt of its soldiers. Korrans fought in 
Yietrlanl because it served both the political nerds of the K O K  
government and the secuiih requirrrnents of the Republic. 
Few 1tw-k~ in English address the service of Lorear1 soldiers 
in L'ietrlam. The novelists Hlvang Sog-vong and Chong-hyo, 
110th of whom served in ITietnanl, have had their fictional ac- 
counts translated into Ellglish.' In his recent stutiv o f  rnoc1t.l-n 
.I'kic author wishes to thal~k \like Burns and 1litc.h ixrrle1- SOI. their- coIllnlerlts 
or] c-a]-lier drdts.  and Srcorld I . i e~~ te r i a r~ t  Aritlrew Sarar~takes and  Mi-Sook Saran- 
~;lhrs for  [heir ~ranslatioll work. 
1 .  Ilwang Sog-F ong. 1'/1? Shudoal of A ~ L S  ( Ithaca, N.Y.. 1994 ) : -411 Chong-hyo. 
C1'7~ilc ljl~dge: I\ ,"lour[ o/ h'ulvn ( N~:LL >'( )rk, 1989 ) . 
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United States ever developed such plans, it uould do so only ail 
ter consultirlg with the Korean gover-nment. Johnson then 
steered the conversation to the topic ol' Koi-ean securih, tying 
Park's interest in a continued L1.S. presencc to his olvn concern 
about Vietnam. tit. told Park that as long as Korean solcliei-s 
were in Southeast Asia, there would be no reduction in V.S. 
strength on the peninsula. Johnson then asked his guest for 
more troops but said nothing about MAP levels. Park hedged. 
saving the matter would have to be studied at greater length. He 
was careful to add that he personally thought the Republic of 
Korea could and ~voulcl provide additional troops to the anti- 
communist effort in Vietilam. From his point of \it.\\: tlle .-her- 
ican presence in Southeast Asia was a righteous cause. Johnson 
pressed on, asking again for an ROK Army division. Park re- 
fused to give an answer, saving that until his government stud- 
ied the issue further, he could make no commitnlent, but he 
thought well of the idea. He was subtly telling his host that Iio- 
rea would send tlle troops 0nly when his country had an agree- 
ment in its favor on all the related economic details. This 
response was too mlbiguous for .Johnson, and he continued his 
push. He reassured Park twice that the United States would keep 
its troops in Korea and continue to supply aid. Park looked at 
his host dubiously. With an expression of weary resignation, 
Johnson repeated two more times his desire for a Korean d i~ i -  
sion. M%en the meeting ended, Park had outplayed a master of 
the political deal at his own game.'" 
The presidents, accompanied by their staffs, met again the 
next day fur a similar exchange. This time Park raised the issue 
of MAP transfers directly. Johnson said he understood Park's 
concern but that the appropriations lwel for military aid re- 
mained unresolved in Congress. Park politely told Johnson that 
ROK armed forces were prepared to fight corn~nunisrn any- 
where it appeared-as long as thev had the required American 
assistance. He thus neatly tied levels to the deplovment of 
Korean troops.3o Park was polite but firm in his dealings with his 
American counterpart. Although Iiorea ~vould assist the United 
- - - 
29. Ihld. 
YO. Llemorandum of Conversation, hldv 18, 196.7, Korea riirmob. k o l .  2, box 
254, Korea Countrv File. Satio~lal  Security File, zbzd. 
Korean Troops in Vietnam 435 
States in l'ietnairl, that support could not be taken foi- gra1ltt.d. 
Park beat Johnsc)n badlv in their meetings. 
Follou,-up negotiations in Seoul \\-ere equalh- one-sided. lio- 
rean diplomats controlled the agenda and made thy proposals, 
~i,hile the ,Anlericans responded as best thev could. The t(or-t.an5 
began the negotiations with their ideal objective\. In his stud\, 
Blackburn appro~inglv quotes General Dwight E. Beach's cha1-- 
acterizatioi~ of the Korean requests as a "avish list." He contends 
that these requests prove that Korean interest in troop deplo\- 
ment was financial, th~is  making the soldiers South Korea even- 
tuall\ sent to L7iet11arn mercenaries. The problem with this 
arsessinent is that Blackburn bases it on a misinterpretation of 
the evidence. The proposals were just an opening move and 
clearly allowed for future compromise and agreement. There 
\vas never any concern that Korea \trould refuse troops t o  i'iet- 
nam if its terms were not met. ,Ambassador Br0.u.n madat this 
clear in a cable to the State Departrnent. "There has r~e\~t.i bern 
amT suggestion bv the President or the Pri lme] Mirl [ister] of anv 
bargaining in connection \tit11 the despatch of a division." the 
diplomat wrote. He did add. though. that there lvas some pres- 
sure on the matter in the National ,k~semblv .~~ 
The United States eventuallv acceded to all but one requcst 
because the American ambassador in Seoul worried about and 
misread Korean politics. The United States was making heaw 
demands on Korea in addition to the controversial treaty u~ith 
Japan, and Brown simpl~. could not accept Park's assurances that 
a troop deplovment \ro~ild make it easier to ratie the Japanesc 
treat\.. "Korea, a small country bordering on the cornrrlunist 
ivorld, will be in actual combat in one of the most active areas 
of RVN against communist forces. It will have proiided. . . sub 
stantially greater combat manpower than any other free world 
country great or srnall except the United States. This is a deci- 
sion of great import for anv country to make" the ambassador 
stated in :I cable back to the State Department. "But, it is also a 
cold fact that Korea does not have to do this, that it doe\ i i l ~ ~ o l \ ~  
Korea in some additional risks.""' 
31. Klackbtlrn, Abier~enanec and  Lq'r~don Johnson'c "Morr  lug^': 49: Bro\$rl LO 
Rusk. Julb 29. 1C16.5. Korea cables, vol. 2, box 254, Korea Countrv File. hatloiial 
Securitc Filc. L B J  Librdrk. 
32. Brown t o  Rusk, Juh  10, 196.5, Brown to \laxbell Tablor. .Jurle I, 1!16.5, zbzd. 
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Brown teared that the deplovrnent could get callghr up i ~ i  
the con trovers! surr-ounding the settleinen r I\ ith Japan, jeopar-- 
dizing both agi-eenlen~s. With approwl from M'asliiiigto~i, he de- 
cided to dcct'pt tllc Korean position. The only request the 
Americans refused was a 75 percent pay hike for the KOK mili- 
tar!. Brocvn privatel?- irlformed Park of tlle V.S. coilcessions. 
ending thc negotiations. "We have ria\\,," the arnbassadoi- re- 
ported, "given liirri our ~naximurn political anlmunition." Tlle 
United States acceded to arl agreement that addressed fi~urteen 
points in four different areah. First, and likeli forelnost to the 
Koreans, was the issue oi troop levelf in Korea. The L'ilitrd 
States agi-eed to niake no force 1-eductiorl ~ \ . i  tllout prior corlsul- 
tation and promised that Xmericari actions in i'ietrla~n \crould 
not.jeopardize the securitr of' Korea. Militar~ assistance ~vas a 
second category. The United States promised to increase 41- 
levels b\. $7 million in 1966; suspeildecl scheduled VL4P tr;insf'ers 
for 1966-1967; agreed to provide a11 logistical, transportation, 
and supplv requirements for ROK troops irl \'ietnairl; initiated 
a program to rnodei-nire rnilitarv equipment: and arrailged to 
pav overseas per diem f-i)~- all ROK rnilitar~. pe r~o i~ne l  in LTiet- 
nam. The third area \vab ec-onornic pr-ocurerl~ent. The United 
States agreed to butr suppljt.$ for \'ietilarn froin South Korean 
suppliers and to hirr Korearl c-onstruction \vorkers and firms for 
projects in i7ietnarn. It also agreed to pi-o~idt' s~ipport foi- social 
urlfdi-e pr-olec ts. Specilicall~,, I.Pn~eric;~rls \irould fund economic 
developrllcnt projects; pro.iidt. a $150 million development 
loan; priv evelfare relief for needv Koreans; maintain or- irlci-east. 
the number and ainount of t1.ainirlg pi-ogram granth; and in- 
crease the export ok American foodst~lffs. '~~ 
The crisis that Brown had fear-ed rievt.1- developed, at least 
on the issue of' sending a di\.ision to %'ietnltinr. 'The National h- 
semblv approved dle deploz.rnent quickl~. The ratificatio~l of' the 
settlement treatv ~ i l h  Japan 111-oved inore cc)ntrrltious. . i~ lg~- \ -  
words wer-c thrown about i r l  Seoul, and all membera o f  tllc 01,- 
position resigned their teats in the National zissenrilr>lr. 1.atht.r 
than witness the ratification. This act toi-ced Park's political parn. 
- - - - - - - . - - - - - 
133. Blackbur-11, .Mur-rw~r~rG.~ (17~d L ~ n d o n  Johrlson '.\ ".l/lort, FLIL,~ ". ~50: I ~ J - O W I I  10 
Rusk. -july 29, 196.5, h r c a  (,ahlea, c o l .  2, t ~ o x  2.54. Ror.ra ( :ount~-~ Filc.. Narion;il 
Secllriry File, LB] L,ibrar-\. 
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to bear sole 1-esporlsibilit~ for the agr-ecrrirnt. Ever1 tklough a rrla- 
~ o r i ~  of the Kort~an public opposeti i t .  Park sur-lived tllc' storin. 
He still had the solid support of' the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency, an internal security force, and rhc. acquiescence 01' thtb 
army.'" 
1471ile Kom-earls \\restled over the appi-old of' both agree- 
ments, Lyndon Johnson finalized a decision to send U.S. com- 
bat troops to LTietnam, u~hich he announced on jul! 28, 1965. 'j 
At this sainr time the United States decided to t i~ l lo~ t  up on 
Park's standing offer and requested the service o f  a second di- 
l.ision. Elements of the (lapita1 Diiisioia were still in ti-;illsit to 
I'ietnain from Korea udlen Ainbassador Kiln inet ~vitll \\'illia~ri 
Bundy and ~ s k e d  if the elnitetl State4 iiltcr1dc.d to solicit the sur- 
lice of' another unit. Kim said his rnilitar-1 attach& had Icarned 
that the issue ura\ under active consickration in the I'cntagon. 
The Llnitcd States ~zotrld probabl~, inake a~lotller eqtrc-ht, Belnth- 
replied, but the decision 11.a.; still under discuss~orl and nc, final 
decision had been reached. M'hen i t  \\,ax appropriate, tile i\sut. 
i\lould be discussed pcrsonallv kt-it11 Park. ") 
The Korean t.mbass\, had tione a good job of detectiilg 
,American interest in a second dilision but was less successfill at 
uncovering the nature of' the debate wi th i~~  the L.S. go\ern- 
nlrnt. Rrpresentati\,cs of both the Statc and Dt.tensr depart- 
nlents wanted another- k r e a i l  tiivisiorii ir; ['ietnanl, belt ther 
dicagreed stronlgli ori 1101\. to achit.\c. t h a ~  goal. hlc%'arnara 
\\-anted to condition the ;iutlior-iratiori o f  rllrc-e peilciirlg loans 
on tlre drplo!.merlt of a secontl ciilrisiorl, \t.i-iilr thr Start. Depart- 
men t opposed any cucll cc ~rlrlectic )n. The I'ratsiht hacl publich 
promised Park the loans in h l a ~ ,  and thev \t.ere ;ill-cad\ part of a 
, - 
quid /,YO qzto fi)r ratification of the Japanese \ytllrrnthilt trt1at\.\)' 
Such conditions seerned unnecessan ~vh~nn 11  go ti at ions f o r -  
the second division began in Seoul. Prime \Eiiliatc-.r- c:lrorlg 11- 
k~von had lutlch wit11 Brott.11 on Dect.1nbt.r 22 and told hirn that 
Park and hl[iiaistei~ of' Sational Def'en\e Kim \\ere PI-tbpared to 
34. Chu.surr I lbo, , lur~c.  20. 23 ,  , j u l ~  23. ;lug. ! 2 ,  I 3 .  IYti3. 
3.5. Van ilehlark. l r~ to  L/LI, ((uagmire. 2 1 i : R1ackt)urrl. .L1~t.cr.r1,urir\ utld I .\ ti~inri 
Joh n.sor1 's '';Vfuw 1111,q\", .-) 1 - .52. 
36. ~lernor.arlclun1 01' (;onvc.rsation, Ilec.. !-I. 1'365, kor-c-:i c-ubles. 1.01. :\. t)ox 
L ) * -  
,:):I. Kol-ea (:ountt-v File, Sarion;il Sectlrit? File, 1_E3] I .ibr:d~.v. 
37. Fr.ar1c.i~ hl.  Baror- KO Jic(;c:or.gt. Kuritly, Ilec . '29. l!)(;:i. ~ h l d .  
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\c.ntl ;i \ec*orltl R O K  .-\r.111\ di\;ir~orl. 'lil:. oil:\ probleins uoulti i > ~  
timing ,ind iil~h domestic political rvactior:. %'he Kore,,ll\ \trt.rt. 
h e s i ~ a i ~  t o  \{art negotiation\ \ci 40orl dtrr- the cicplo\~ncrlr o f  
thc- C.apitai Division. a result, C;hong said that, lor ,ippcar- 
ancv\. ~t ~ t a s  inlpei'ati~r that n high-r.a:l'hing .'rrrlrr.icarl, c i t l l e~  
k/lcNamara or Kusk, SCoetB tc) corlsul~ \ t i  tia Piark [ o t L ~ r ) r . ~  the
~ \ S U C  hecdrrle public..iH 
Mu\k dnd \lcNarriaia wcr-r too bus\ to do the ilork oi anr 
anlbassadur. \'ice-Pre\iderit lu i )e r t  H. Hunl y bra. howe\ el; had 
the time and hcld high olfiw. i k  ~nirainlal po\\,t.r. B i l  ear-i\ 'I9tib 
Johnson \vnt Humphrek oil norld tour to pursue the possibii- 
it\ o f  a ilegcdtiated erlti to thy %'it.tilain \iYar, bur his \i\it to Seoul 
had a different purpose. Hurmphr-el'\ rnission to gi\e the I;r)- 
reans the liigh-level cor~sultation the\ civ\i~-eci and t o  cc,rrlince 
Park and other\ in thc go~t.rrinlt.nr illat the derrriorati~rg situa- 
tion in lrietilarrl demarlded pi-oizrpt ~~cr ion .  His rrlveti~lg in Seoul 
went \veil. fi made several I-c3yortAs or1 the 1-e\t11ts o f  his trip. 111 
a meimo to Joilrlson, he statvti, "Prrsitlen t Park i \  ansioi~s t( 1 be 
oi greater help in a'ietnarrl." Hurnpili-e\ ,iho rlotctl, "Theit. itrs\ 
grave concern ill  he govt.rnlrlent cir-cle\ 01 Korea that 1t.e \trould 
bt- s ha rp l~  rc-ducirlg rnilitar~ a~sisl;iilc r :1i rlle \el-\ ri~rlr Lorea 
itas takillg a rnort. actike I-oic. a i l  \ ir~narn." .-Bccordilig t o  the 
notes oi' his preserltatiorl to the. hatiorla1 Sec:~i-it\ (Ac,uilcil, thr  
\'ice-Precidm rc.;)ortetl thar korea itotlPd st~nc1 ~ o ( ) p \  if asked 
but w o ~ ~ l d  want dssuaant es about their- oivn \ectaa-it\. In the 
rnerno 01' a conversation about his meeting in Seoul, Hurnpil~-ei 
quoted Park as sa\ i ~ i g  that Lior-r;l had a "rmi-a1 obligatiorl to take 
up arms fijr ari\ riati011 assaulleci h\; coir~nlurlisrn," but that tie 
"I made it quite clear to President Par-i; arid his goverrrmerit that 
there \\!as no C.S. t~lank chcck or operi ended account. I urgeti 
that he make ;-I \pec'ific. i:)1-0po\al to c i l l i  h1ril~assac101- i o  that 1te 
had sorrnerlling t o  L I ~ L  Libout 3 r d  \ o r n c L  ~Idc;a o i  itrkl;-it thc I<ur.earls 
\.\a11 ted and ne~ded." '~"  
- - 
38. P,ro~t.rl t o  Rusk. 13ec.. 2'1, I!)(;.',. l,/~lti. 
:59. 131ackh111-11, . V l ~ r ~ ( ~ ~ r ~ u ~ r / ~ ~ ~  u r ~ ( i  /.jri(ior~ , /o /?r/so~? .! ".Vlore klug\ '., <54-3.*): Su[tl- 
r ~ ~ a r )  YOL(.S 01  .>.?.7)~t~ .X.S(; \ l t~ : t i~ ig ,  j ~ ~ i .  .5, 1!16(i, i ,Rj  12ibixry; "Su~ t~ t :~a r> ,  of   or^- 
vei-satiorls with L J ~ C  Le;tc-lership 01' ,Japall, l'Iiilippirrc-.s, I<epublic ot (;tiilla, ,111tl 
Korcsa. Dec. 28,  1 96.7)Tjarl. 2. 1966, Ibzd.: t hc L'icc-tircsidc.r~r LO ~11th I'~.esi<lc.ri~,  jar^. 3 .  
1966, NS(; YIeetirlgs, v o l .  3, tab 37, 1 .5 6(j. box 2. NSC %let:~iiigs File. ihid.; Br<)wrl 
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111c negotiatiorls bt'g;~rl ir1 Jan~~;ir-\  1966, aiid the Koreans 
oiicr. again set the age-nda. korearr tlipjoanats p1est.rntt.d a lorig 
li\t of pr-oposals for filidricial ( onlpensatioil in retur-n for tlir 
\econd tfi\i\iorn. ,Irrnc.ric nn otfic.i;ils B~at k irn $2 askiilngtorl called 
this li\r "excessi\ e." BTc)it,~~ i.ejec.ted tilt'sa-. iterris and lrlatir '1 
counter-proposal: Thcl L ni teri Statcks \t o d d  f tmrld additioiial de- 
veloprnent pr<sjec-ts, allo\\ orllv .Xme:.ic.,ir~ and Korc-ar~ bidding 
or1 ccrrai~l . l g e n c ~  fi,r Ir1trrna~ic,n;L1 B>c'\elopinen[ p r o j r c ~ ~ ,  givr 
the Keptiblic of Morcba arl additiorlal dr\.eioprrirrlr loan of $1.5 
million. and cornpc-rlsatr ROK armtld seri icrs foi the chxpcbrises 
incwretl i r l  tr;lilsporting thr second di\icic_,ri to LTietriarri. Tllr 
Kcprearis held firm. fol-cing the L-11itrtl States closei- to their po- 
sition. Kegotiations for the drplo\ment o f  thtl first tli\ i\iori had 
srt a precedent tor the lior.esn position.'" 
Tkw negotiatiorlh cor~clutlcd or1 lI;t11.11 4, L$ hen Krc,\\rtl sent 
a letter to the Lorran Foreign hlinrstc~ cone-cding rnost issue\ in 
Korea's favor. ,Uthough the gerleral cornterits uere leaked to a 
South Korean rle\\T\p:lpc.r, scholars hairp ric-\er h c l  dir-t-c-t access 
to the "Brown letter" i~self. \t.hich I-cinairls classified at  thc tirnc. 
of thi\ \\.I-iting." Th r  terms of the agrrerneilt. iloct ever, have re- 
cermeii~ become il\.ailabIr ir l  other dt'classiiied doc~~inents ,  name]\ 
brief rng books prrpareti for- a \isit to \2iishingtorl, I).(:., by 
Prime hlinister (:hung i r s  1968. I r l  this :.igi.ntecii-poirlt lettt'r. the 
L'nitetl States ag re t~ i  to do i o ~ i r  thirigc: ( i) pa\ ~ l l e  cos~s associ- 
ated with thy deplo\rnenl cllncl seriice of :lit' KOlla A-8rrni n iriet- 
ilarn; ( 2  ) help nlotfcr-lli~th the ar-rrnc-tl for-cr\ o f  South Korea: 
(3)  procure eciuiprr~e~lt, supplic.5, a r ~ d  svriices 101- use 111 &'it-t- 
nanl from Korea and Korthan iirrns: anti  ( 4 )  pr oi itit. c~corlorraic 
assistarlct, to the Rep~iblic of Korca thal \\c,ultl ioster cbco~lonnic 
cie\'eloprnt.rlt. T1lt.s~ iouy  rrlair; r le imm~s 01 thr Kr  owri Iettel 
\\t.r-tb mdde public u hcn it \\-as Iral\c>ti, icztiirng 10 charges i r l  rhr 
h nitrd States, then an0 nab, tk;:et rhc- Koreans L$crcA rlo~hirlg 
more than rnercenar-ies. .a comparisoln o i  the two vei-siorls, ilo\$- 
c.\c.r, shott7s that the iniual account presrntrd to rhr public pllr 
thc agrc-c-rr~erlt i r l  a ligllr clesigilc~tf to laior the. K O K  go\vi-n- 
- -  - 
10 Kr~sk. 1)ec.. 30. 22. 19ti5. Iior.c~;~ (.ll)lt,b. v o l .  :i, t)ox 2.-)5. Lor-(.a C:oun~r.\ E'i l t . .  \a- 
: ic~rlal Sc>ctrri? File, ibid. 
- 4 0 .  l i ~ . o ~ . ~ i  1 0  Rusk,   jar^. 2I). [!)titi. I)avicl I-'.. H t x l !  ro hIcC;t.orge Kurrciy, ,]all. 25. 
I9ti6, rnclosed in 11Ic.Geol-ge liurici\ t o  ,joiirlsoli. I;F'~) .  3. !!166. ihid. 
4 1. 13lac.kburr1, .\/lrrcmu.rze,\ and Lv7ldo.ri Johnson :< ".Llorr Flu,q~". T,li-.?i. 
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ment. The leaked version made it seem that the Koreanb had 
driven a hard bargain-which led to the mercenarv charge. 
Items that might embarrass the ROK government and qualifi- 
cations on some of the more generous American concessions 
were absent from this rendition. Exarnples of embarrassing 
items include an American agreement to pay overseas dutx 
bonuses and death-and-disability allowances for the Koreans 
serving in Vietnam. Examples of the qualifications include the 
U.S. agreement to purchase supplies and material from Korea, 
but onlv provided that Korea had the production capabilin; 
could meet specification and delivery schedules, had prices that 
were "fully competitive" with other sources in the region, and 
that procurement conformed to U.S. policies regulating the flow 
of gold. There were clearly limits to American acquiescence, but 
these terms were enough to win over the I i~ reans .~ '  The Na- 
tional Assembly approved another deployment at the end of the 
month, and the Ninth ROK Infantry Division, also known as the 
White Horse Division, began arriving in September.?" 
Once in Vietnam, Korean troops proved themselves an im- 
portant asset. This contingent was the second largest foreign 
army fighting in Vietnam, behind only the United States. The 
Koreans conducted missions along thr central coast of South 
Vietnam. The Capital Division operated throughout the war in 
the Qui Nhon-Binh Khe area, while the M'hite Horse Division 
was stationed along Highwav I around the cin of Ninh Hoa. 
The Second ROK Marine Brigade, which arrived in Vietnam 
with the Capital Division, was further up the coast and went on 
several missions with the U.S. Marine Corps. The nvo infantry 
divisions stayed in Vietnam until Marclr 1973, actually outnum- 
bering American ground forces at that time. ln 1968 Korea suf- 
fered 1,100 combat fatalities. General M'heeler, chairman of thr 
Joint Chiefs, put these numbers into context. In a memo to Pres- 
ident Johnson, he noted that, on a percentage basis, the Korean 
units suffered a combat fatality rate, 2.2 percent, that s~l~.passc.d 
that of the South Vietnamese and was below the ,l~~ler.ic.an ratr 
of 2.6 percent. American generals in Saigon carnr t o  \*alllt. the 
- - - - -- - - -- - - . . . - - - - - 
42. "Korean Military .Assistance t o  the Republic o f  Viet-Nam: L1.S. ( 3  )l1111li t- 
ments," Prime llinister Chong I1-kwon visit, box 257, Korea Country File, Na~iolial 
Security File, LBJ Library. 
43. Blackburn, Mercunurics and Ljndon Johnson's "More l.'Ingx ", 58. 
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qualit! of their Korean allies. In a farewell speech to the CZ?lite 
Horse Division li~hen lle left L'ietnam, Westmoreland observed, 
"Perhaps the hest compliment to your effectiveness comes from 
thC North krietnamese Army and the Viet Gong by  their hesi- 
tancy to engage vou in battle. You have earned a reputation 
ainong coinmunist forces as men to fear, respect.. . and avoid."44 
Lknericaris outside of the military stationed in Vietnain also 
appreciated the Korean effort. In late October and earlv No- 
vember 1966, Joh~lson ~isi ted South Korea in a well-received 
trip. The crowd cheering the American President threlv so 
much conf'etti that the secret service had to stop his car and 
clean the ~ e n t s .  The trip was mainly a goodwill tour, but John- 
son had a short, substantial meeting  kith Park on November 1 
at the Blue House, the KOK executive niansion. As host, Park 
started the coilversation. According to the ,lrnerican record of 
this conversation, the first point he mentiorled was the inipor- 
tance of keeping K.S. strength on the peninsula at current l e ~ -  
elli. Johnson was clearly more interested in Vietnam. He talked 
about ho\\' the 1930s had demonstrated the need to resist ag- 
gression. Korea, he said, making a reference to current troop 
deplo\,inents, Ivas making a contribution in South k'ietnam pro- 
portional to that of the United States. Johnson then coyly raised 
the issue of more troops. He said he was not in Korea to recruit 
soldiers. However, after discussing the problems M'estrnoreland 
faced in k'ietnam, he said he foresaw a need for inore merl in 
L'ietnam, so all concerned parties sllould think about how they 
~vould respond. Park made it clear that future deplovmerlts 
might be possible. but oi11\ after the Korean presidential elec- 
tion in lC367.'1" 
Rusk and AIcNamara considered Korea11 involvement in 
k'ietnarn a great coup and later that month sent a telegram to 
- 
- . -- - - - - - - 
44. Stantoll, l,Tiet.na~t~ 0)-der 01 Battle, 272-273, 333: thr ellipses are in the orig- 
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') - " 
- s ~ ,  Korc-a Country File, Yatiorial Sec.urity File. ibid. 
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Brown instructing him to start talks on a third division. Br.oi\n 
refused. reminding them of .Johnson's assurance to Park. More 
importantly, the ambassador added that "it appears to r n t .  that 
we are in danger of seeming to take the Koreans Sol- granted." 
The United States asked for a small medical unit and got it, then 
for noncombat ti-oops, and then a combat di~ision. Less than six 
months later, the United States asked for and got still another 
division. "The Koreans will wonder ivhen and where this will 
end and why others are nor pressed to do likewise.""l' 
In June 1967. as Brown prepared to 1e;n.e his post in Seoul. 
he cabled Rusk and William Bund!; advising them that how the 
United States raised the issue of a third dikision \vas important. 
Americans should approach Park as an equal and should hold 
high-level briefings and consultations about developrllents in 
irietnam. The deployment of additional ROK forces should be 
raised onlv within this context. Brown reminded them that Park 
had said publicly that he had no intention of sending any more 
Koreans to i'ietnam. He could rever-sr llimself, but he had to be 
glven good reason. Walt Kostow. the new National Security Xd- 
cisel; gave the President a copy of Brown's telegram.47 
The President heeded this ad~ice  to a degree. In July 1967, 
in response to another Joint Chiefs request for a troop increase, 
he sent Washington lawver Clark Clif'ford and hfax~vell Tavlor, 
now a special presidential advisel; on an international trip to get 
more men. Johnson could not have sent two more influential 
or significant figures. Ta)rlor had held important positions in 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. He had 
helped develop the strategv of flexible response of the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations. Clifford was one of' the rnost in- 
fluential private citizens in Lknerica at the time, ha~rirlg served 
as special counsel to President Harrv S Truman and helped im- 
plement Truman's policy of containment during the early dki: s 
of the Cold War. As a successful laiiyer in private practicr, he ad- 
vised many Democrats, particularly presidents I(en1lt.d) and 
Johnson. Nevertheless, the Taylor-Clifford mission to siva~ 
anv of the nations it  kisited. "Even South Korea had its tlo~rbts." 
- - -  - - -  - - 
46. l / ) ~ d .  
47. Brown to Rush and JYilliatn Bundy, June 7. 1967 erlclosrcl in h a l t  It. Ros- 
tow to Johnson, .June 7, 1967, Korea cables and menloj. vol. 4. box 255. Korea 
Countrv File, National Secunb File, zbzd. 
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Cliffoi-d I-ecalled in his meinoirs. "President P a r k a  General 
who had seized power through a coup-made us sit through a 
dissertation on his political difficulties." His contemporary as- 
sessinent of the trip was more positive. "President Park is faced 
with a genuine political crisis," Taylor and Clifford reported. 
Park told the nvo dignitaries that the United States could de- 
pend on him to send more soldiers when his political situation 
bvas more stable.4x Despite their influence, Clifford or Taylor 
worked away from the glare of publicit)., and neither held a 
highlv visible position within thy goverilrnent. Thc tact that the 
two arrived in Korea clearly interested in getting additional 
troopsalso \vorked agairlst them. 
Although thivarted, Johnso11 still ivanted a third division. 
On November- 25 U'illianl Portei; the 11civ iAme~-ican ambassador 
in Seoul, cabled I$vashiirgtoil that the political situation in Korea 
had become more stable in the months since the Clif'ford- 
Taylor- mission. The dornestic PI-oblerns Park had faced ivc-rt. 
over. Porter thought it ivas no\\- possible to approach the Korea11 
president about a third dirision. He thought the 1-cent arrival 
of additional Australian and Thai troops also helped put some 
pressure on Korea. Each nation had increased the size of its mil- 
itarv contingent by 2,000 rnen, and both were co~n~nitted to fin- 
ther expansion in ly(i8. Rostow warned Johnson that tllc 
embassy expected a number of Korean requirements that would 
be "expensive, rraried and cornplicated." Even though Porter 
cautioned that the recruitment of an additional Korean division 
ivould be "an exercise iiith rapidly dirrlinishing returrls," John- 
soil decided to irrake the request." The returns might be di- 
ini~lishing, but a third Korean divisioir ~ w s  till cheaper and 
politically less painful for him than the idea of se11ding Inore 
Americans. 
The State Department had Eugene Eocke, the deputy U.S. 
ambassador in Saigon, visit Scoul in December on his way to the 
Crlited States. Locke's mission ivas "to iillpress on Park the ur- 
- - 
- - 
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gent need for an additional Korean force in IT[iet] N[aril]." 
Locke was instructed to represent the Lhrlerican desire for- 
another division as the personal view of Johnson himself. Oil 
December 7 Locke and Porter met ivith Park, Prirne Minister- 
Chong, and the ministers of National Defense and Foreign ;V'. 
fairs for over two hours. Park, according to Porter. controlled 
the conversation. The South Korean president said he could 
send a "light division" to ITietrlam, but the tirning anci "arrange- 
inents" h r  such a deployment would require some ivork. He 
thought Korea could replace troops currentlv se r~ ing  in lopsti- 
cal and support positions with civilians, whjch would irlake it 
possible to introduce more combat units into Irietnaim i$.ith only 
a small increase in the actual number of uniforined ROE; per- 
sonnel serving in Southeast A h .  Over the next two weeks, 
American officials and Korean miliury officers met in Seoul to 
determine the necessarv "arrai~geinenu;."~" 
The Koreans were primarily interested in building up their 
defenses. Since late 1966 North Iiorea had been sending- raid- 
ing parties into the South, ambushing LArnerican and ROE;  nits 
patrolling the Dernilitaiized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Ko- 
reas. Helping South Vietnam resist communist aggression was 
all well and good, but the ROK inilitar). wanted to be sure that 
this effort in no wav jeopardized the securitl. of' Korea itself. 
On December 8 Porter and General Charleb H. Bonesteel met 
with the National Defense Minister Kim and the chair-man of' 
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The!. learned that the Koreans 
wanted the LTnited States to probide the equipment fur a 
counter-infiltration force of' eight battalions, helicopters for 
three new companies, enough artillery pieces to man six battal- 
ions, and a new squadron of Phantom F-4C: planes. The South 
Koreans also wanted the immediate deli\.er-y of tbvo desti-o>rers 
that the LTnited States had agreed to provide, plus llea\y, con- 
struction equipment-dump tr~icks, rock crusher-s, bulldozers, 
and the like-to supply fi\re engineel- battdions building the 
new national superhighrvay from Pusan at the \outhei.r~ tip o f  
the peninsula to S e ~ u l . ~ '  
- - -- - -- 
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Park also wanted and got another high-level briefing. On 
Decernber 21 he met with Johnson for lunch in Canberra, Aus- 
tralia. The nvo presidents were in the city for the fiineral of Aus- 
tralian Prime Minister Harold Holt. For the first half of the 
meeting, .Johnson and Park exchanged flattering remarks about 
each other's dependabilio; as allies in the fight against commu- 
nism. Park then explained that the North Korean attacks had 
complicated his ability to send a larger force to Vietnam. He had 
to be able to tell his public that the deployment of' an additional 
di~ision in no way jeopardized their security. This issue had mo- 
tivated him to ask for such a large amount of equipment for use 
on the peninsula, rather than in Vietnam. Johnson replied that 
he was favorably inclined toivai-d the Korean request, but more 
troops were urgentlv needed in lTietnarn and he wanted Park to 
start the deplovment on the strength of' his reassurances. Park 
I-etused, He said he needed firm American commit- 
ments. if 11e was to get the necessary approval of the National 
Xssembl?.. Once again in a weak bargaining position, Johnson 
asked wllat Park needed. The Korean president answered that 
he wanted anti-infiltration equipment in Korea before he would 
send any more troops to Vietnam. Johnson agreed, also saying 
that the United States would expedite delivery of a destroyer, 
provide some of the equipment requested based on an assess- 
ment by the American Joint Chiefs, and keep MAP funds at cur- 
rent levels for Korea, even though Congress had reduced the 
overall amount of funding. Park then gave Johnson what he 
~vanted. The Korean president agreed to have the new division 
in Vietr~airl bv March 1, even though Defense Minister Kim said 
it would take until April or early May.52 
North Korea11 infiltration and raids that had little to do 
ivith \'ietnam quickly scuttled this agreement. Many observers 
thought the North Korean effort reflected a desire to aid their 
communist allies in lTietnam, citing a speech by the North's Kim 
11-sung on the need K01- cornnlunist nations to aid Vietnam in its 
-- -- - - - 
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\trugglr against thy  kT rli t t d  S~tt.\-c.la.~ci.i\ .fi cxlnor-tatiorr tc, rht .  
cr)inrnunist rution\ o f  the cvol-ld e o  balrlc! con111a1 il.oops I ( 1  
Southeast *kia."' Hob e\ el-, tile n-rasor~t, iol N o r ~ l ~  I<orenrl n aid\ 
\very local rather than iiltei-~larioll~ii. .4ccc,r.dillg t o  Rot~rrr  
Scalapirlo and ( :llorlg-sil, L,ce. iht. a:r,ic.i;\ it  (.re attrmpts tc, irl- 
duct. a grnen-al irast~r-r-cCtioil \irnilsr- 1:) gil;ii o I  iflr Naejc~i~al Lib- 
eration Front in t'ietnarn that {he Yor i r l  hoprci \vould ~inifi tile 
korean 
Thesr small ail( ur-cions ttfc>re tolcr ai)lt. rluisa~lce\ urr eil 
11li1-t\ -olle-marl c.o~nlrla~ac$t) ulli t (,I Y( ) a  1 h Kc ,;can .-Br nn\ officer-\ 
cut ;I, hole th-ough a ~.il;li~~-lir~l\ f e r l~c  in ail .$lrleri(.;lll-~no~lit~r.d 
sector ol ti l t .  Dh lZ  orr j anua r~  18, 1C)68. Tht. group tra\t.!rd 
onl\ at night, keeping to rrlouiltaill 1-idge5, and nra\ ~vell ar.rned 
with grenades, auto111;itic iteaporls, and explo4ives. The group'\ 
mission was simple: to assabsinatr Park. .$ xcondai-v target e.tr3s 
the U.S. e~nbaxsl. 011 Januark 21, :t tknous:erltl yards short o f  the 
Blue Hoerse, a suspicious police of'ticrr \ropprd the coinillaildos 
ah a cl~eckpoiilt ; l r d  exposecl thrnl. Tl~ch (-~:j~irrlandos then killed 
a policr officer; :inti a ruilrliilg firrfight i)rokr out in Sroul LLS thr 
- - 
c.orninarldos atternipteti to rscape. ) ' 
North KOI-ca struck again on .jaii;r:ir-s 23, ivhrrl it capnirccl 
the U .S.S. Prlrhlo. Sailing off tilt. c-astt.1-ri c,c,asL of tht. pt.ninsula, 
the ship \\-as or1 a rnissiorl to collcct elrc.troilic signal infor-rrla- 
tiorl. ,% 3irlall flotilia of thr North Kon-mri Nav\ \ur-I-ourlded and 
boardrd the ship-thc. first time si1lc.e the LVdr o t  1812 that a 
foreign ilak~ had captelr~ti ara A h ~ ~ r r i c i i ~ l  5hip, .kc-01-tiiing to Glif- 
for-d. the neiz Seen-t.tai-I of Dcfeilse, nwv\ of the P l ~ c D l o  allnost 
broke Johnsor~. The Prrsitieilt thought the s e i~u re  o f  the ship 
was a communist effort to draev .%lllrric;in ; ~ t ~ e n t i o ~ l  from L'iet- 
nain and to overestt~nci L.S. r r l i l i  tun rrcources cvl th arlotllrr 
engagement.'" 
L.In~erican ofiic-ials or-1ic.d that ROL 1eaeic.r~ \vt.~-r prrpared 
to launch a second Korea11 $\'ar- in I cr:tliatioli for. tht~sr attack\. 
- -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - 
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Orn .jar:uar\. 24. .irmll>assac%or l'or-ter rrn1e.a \vital an  cnr.ag:ed Park. 
I r l  Pli )r.tcbr-'5 \t.(,r-tis, liar-k "vehermrentl\~" dernanded a rmlilitar~~ re- 
sporl\e. Ht. \a~ggt-sted cithcr dn attack on tht. base of the com- 
irlando unit that had conldtact~d the Blur House raid o r  a \trike 
agairlst N ( ~ K  th Koreail air 2nd ll:l\ai siatioils or] the ea\t  coast. 
Tilt- ROK , h . r r l \  \\ ould iiot takt. .Inv unilateral action, ~ O I -  rlo\\-. 
but P d  uai ilcd Porter that 1-t.tali;iton-v 1-xiti\ \bTerc ine.-\.-itable. He 
i~ l sc ,  exp-t~ssed ii-ritatiorr that the L'ilited Staivs sllc)u,ed rrlorc 
coricern about rhe Purblo than the- attacks along tti-lt. DMZ or the 
attempt tlii assahsinate Iliirl. In ;a cable to $\'ashiilgtorl. Porter 
oi ahSid!.;lllCC. barr it thtb!-ti is anotilt~i- irlcidvnt ail bets ai-Y o1Y.''" 
Liltfloug't.l wcii ;au7ar-c. oi the irnpoa-r~ilct. the .]o't.rnsorl ad- 
rninistratiorl pL1c.t.d on i7ic.tn;lrrl, Porwr \varrred that it \\ ould'i>t. 
alnr\.ist. to push for tht. third di\kiori. Ttic K4)K.loint B:i!icis had 
just askvct (iener-al Kone~stecl, (;ornrn;erldt.r-ir1-c~llie.f oi the 
L nitetl Satioils (;orrrirland. to i,t:giia j>l>iriiliilg ii,r the return of' 
Elorcan f orces in 9.'ictnaiil. .I'Blt* staff' ()i '  the C.S. chrrlijSass\7 be- 
1ie~t.d this \\,as normal contingenc~ planniilg, but tlle I equest de- 
rnarrtlcd caution. "For LY.S.  to prcs\ ROK\ at prc.\erlt jurlcture 
might \\ell re.5ult irr decision a g a i ~ r \ ~  t l i ~ p a t ~ h ,  \\7krich reinairls 
y uite reas [ona] ble in rnr opinion pro\ idd thei-t. ix  a satisfactor-\ 
outcome tt) P ~ ~ r i h / N o r t h  &;rear1 artnihticc \iolatioil pix)blern."58 
Officiais in $\-aslliilgton , I).( :.. \\ 01-rid a b o ~ ~ t  these problerrls 
in Korlra and their iri1pac.t on troop dt'plo\ inr-nts for \'ietnam. .A 
joint rllt'ssagt- frorri the I)c-ft.rlse arrd Stztt, (iepai-tillerltx g;l\,t' 
Porter- clear instrtrctioins: "Pi)u sho~:lcl collvt'v to Park irl whatt-ver 
\\.c,i-tls !.ou find ;ippropriate that loost. ~ a l k  111 h r - e a  about pulliilg 
back soint- fipr-ces trorn B'ictnarn ha\ not. n-1 c] p l ~ i ~ ]  t, 1101 been 
$\ell received here." The State Dt-parirrleiit belie\-t.ci that an\ 1-e- 
nloval ot' Lorean units ti-orrm B'ietilanl or a I-elaactancc ro bend 
mor-cA soldiers \\,otald be a Nortll H<ur-c~an victor\.. Sarmucl L). 
Soasth korva, rt.:~horleti, "la ti)llo\\.s ti-om this threat1 of' argurncnt 
rh;~i r\,hc-rl things \ ~ r t l c .  cio\\,n in South Kor-ra, I'a[r]k could \\-in a 
- - 
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moral and psvchological victoi-17 o\cr finl 11-s~111g, silo\\ his ~ 0 1 1 -  
tempt for Kiln, and confidence i l l  hiarrself ;1111(1 his coutltr-t, i f  ht' 
could announce that ,~dditiorlal torceh \ b i l l  bc. \cut to k'it't- 
N~~.": ' ! '  At a Februai-y 7 il~eeeirlg of' thr National Src~iritv 6 :oun- 
cil, General Wheeler irarned: "Thc p~.oblenls iri Korea ar-e such 
that it t i l l  be hard to get the South jiioreans r o  e\eil sencl rlw 
light di\ision thev hacl pl-ornised."O'j i'et. the third di\-ision br- 
came even nrore i~npor'tarlt wkierl it'estnro~.cl;~lld recj~lrstetl an- 
other increase in Inailpower, forcing a profound ticbate \\'itl~iil 
the C .S. ge)ve~-nrrlrnt ;hour .knc~-ican p( )lit lo\\ ;li-d \'irtn;ri~r.'" 
If troops were necrssarr , i.\nsloil ) ollr;sc ) r l  prefer.rt>d tc 1 use 
foreign one.; to avoid some of the dornrstic r.,iinificath)il> that 
an increase in U.S. troops \.t70uld entail. T i ~ o  ~ L L T ' S  liltrr at ;in- 
other- NSC meeting, the Pre\ident \aid, "L,et's assurrle t\c ha\r to 
have Irrore troops. I think \ve hhc~lild noiv tell the allies that \\re 
could iose Southeast Asia \\ithout their help. The first to trll is 
Park. Tell him that none of us \rant defeat. If it take\ more rnt.11 
to avoid defrat let's get thcm." n/lcNaialar;~, 1181~) \\';IS still attrnd- 
ing NSC mectings at this tirnr, cautio11t.d johnson that this 
might not br feasible. "Onc. thillg \ \e haLC to c!o is put mu-t.  sup- 
port in Kox-ea," hc  $,liti."" 
A-line~-ica~r hopes tor- a {bin-ci rli~ision rndrd  oln hlar-ch 22. 
The U.S. em bass^. in Seoul ~-rpc,~-rc-.ci that I;c)~-eigii hfinistrr- I(:hio 
Elad annoumcrd that South Hb;oi.c:i \\auld not send -1 111 inorr 
troopr to \'ie tn;rin ." Thr  ITnitt.c-l St:rtes ~vonitl ha\ c to 1-esol\ r 
the manpowel- probleirl bithour Korea11 a\sistancrc.. 
M'hen the Rt~puhlic of' 1ior.t.a sent its soldiers r o  sc.1.t.c. in 
k'ietnann. it did so t~ecausr i t  coilskcle~-ec8 thc actiori t o  i)c- i n 1  its 
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Southeast Asia. This gesture was an effort to keep U.S. troops on 
the Korean peninsula, and only when North Korea began a se- 
lies of raids and attacks across the DMZ did KOK leaders decide 
against sending any more divisions overseas. These attacks 
clearlv changed South Korean priorities. Although the Repub- 
lic of &rea still supported the ;\merican effort in \'ietnam and 
kept ib troops in that country, i t !  interests had changed and pre- 
vented the introduction of any new units. These facts show that 
Koreans fought in Vietnam because it was in South Korea's na- 
tional interest, not as a way to make a profit for the Republic. 
